Agency theory, stewardship theory and residual right: logics and interpretative models
Salvatore Esposito De Falco, Antonio Renzi
The observation of the Governance systems in use in the industrial countries underlines diametrically opposite points of view in the interpretation of the art of corporate governance. Considering such contradictions, today more than ever, it would seem useful wondering how governance systems influence the distribution of the value produced by the enterprise, or better what stakeholders must profit of the economic wealth as a result of the business and, in the end, what relationships can be established with the wealth in favour of development, employees and ownership. In the attempt to interpret such problems, this work proposes a reading key that integrates the perspective of the Agency Theory and the Stewardship Theory. For this aim, the work ends with a model that, starting from the comparison of the figure of the Agent with that one of the Principal, shows the actual limits in extreme methodological choices, like the two approaches that are object of the study (Agency theory and Stewardship theory), underlining as it is not possible to plan the corporate governance on the base of absolute paradigms that emerge from both the socio-organizational culture and the one at the base of corporate finance studies.
Agency Theory, Stewardship Theory, Residual Right, Risk and Risk Aversion